Marshall Auerback writing in the MMT inspired New Economic Perspectives blog revisits the Eurozone problem and comes up with a different solution which has much to recommend it from Irelands point of view. Here is the conclusion of the article.;-
..Perhaps we’re looking at this the wrong way around: Given the continued German aversion to more broadly-based pan European style fiscal programs, which its populace continues to see as nothing but bailouts for lazy Mediterranean free-loaders, there is another way to solve the euro crisis.
Let Germany leave the euro zone.
Let’s leave aside the politics for a moment as there are many who believe that a German exit from the euro zone in effect means the end of the euro because a number of other countries would leave.
So consider this exercise solely from an economic context: The likely result of a German exit would be a huge surge in the value of the newly reconstituted DM. In effect, then, everybody devalues against the economic powerhouse which is Germany and the onus for fiscal reflation is now placed on the most recalcitrant member of the European Union. Germany will likely have to bail out its banks, but this is more politically palatable than, say, bailing out the Greek banks (at least from the perspective of the German populace).
To be sure, this will not come without some cost to Germany: Germany will probably save its banking system at the expense of destroying its export base. The newly reconfigured DM will soar against the euro and become the ultimate safe haven currency. This will mitigate the write-down impact of the inevitable haircuts on euro-denominated debt, because the euro (assuming it is retained by the remaining euro zone countries) will fall dramatically. Even if the euro itself vaporizes, the Germans simply will pay back debt in the old currencies, likely fractions of their previous value. And the German populace would likely find it far more palatable to be bailing out its own banks (as it did during the reunification period), as opposed to spending German taxpayer funds to recapitalize the banking systems of a bunch of Mediterranean “profligates”.
By the same token,, a fall in Germany’s external surplus means a large increase in the budget deficit (unless the private sector begins to expand rapidly, which is doubtful under the scenario described above), so Germany will find itself experiencing much larger budget deficits. In the current German situation, although the country runs a large current account surplus, it is insufficient to offset a high private sector predisposition to save (which means there is some deficit). But the current account surplus does allow for a smaller budget deficit than its so-called “profligate” Mediterranean neighbors, whilst still facilitating the private domestic sector’s desire to net save. As we have argued before, it is the “profligacy” of Germany’s Mediterranean trading partners, which has allowed it to rack up huge current account surpluses, and therefore run smaller budget deficits than the likes of the so-called PIIGS countries.
Once divorce from the euro is complete, Germany will regain its fiscal freedom. This is itself something the Germans should celebrate, providing their government takes advantage of their newfound fiscal freedom. Remember, once it returns to the Deutsche Mark (DM), Germany becomes the issuer, as opposed to the user of a currency, as is the case under the euro, and is fully sovereign in respect of its fiscal and monetary policy. Consequently, the German government can offset the external shock by running large government budget deficits, which will add new net financial assets to the system (adding to non government savings) available to the private sector. Germany might well decide not to adopt this course of action, given its historic resistance to aggressive fiscal policy, but it will no longer be bound by any of the institutional constraints inherent in the European Monetary Union.
In the meantime, the rest of the euro zone gets a huge boost to competitiveness via a (likely) substantial fall in the euro against the newly reconstituted DM. Also, the resultant potential instability means that the ECB would likely have to stand ready to backstop all of the bonds to prevent this from becoming a fully-fledged crisis, but it would encounter less political resistance to doing so, given the absence of a restraining German voice in the European Monetary Union.
It seems like an odd way to consider the problem, but the paradox of the current situation suggests that an exit from the euro zone of its strongest member, rather than its weakest links, might well be the optimal means of saving the euro, in the absence of a fully fledged return to separate national currencies. (link to full article)
mer O’Siochru is a qualified architect and valuation surveyor. She was a founder of Feasta and served on its executive committee for many years. She is director of EOS Future Design which designs and develops sustainable systems and settlements. She also manages the Feasta-led Smart Tax Network which is funded by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government to develop tax policies in areas related to the environment. She lives in Dublin.
