In 2019, the Canadian government introduced a price on carbon pollution and recycled the money directly to households—a policy advocated for by economists from across the political spectrum. The policy reduced the country’s emissions, and the rebates increased most Canadians’ incomes even after considering the impact of the carbon price on their budgets. In short, the policy was a win for the environment and the public. Yet today, both the policy and the Trudeau administration are deeply unpopular, with the opposition poised to win upcoming national elections and vowing to “ax the tax.” Why did a successful policy fail to win public approval?
Carbon rebates, also known as carbon dividends, are regular payments made to households funded by carbon pricing revenue. The fee charged on fossil fuels is passed through the market to consumers, sending a price signal to shift away from fossil fuels. When the revenue is then returned directly to the public, it more than offsets the higher fuel prices for most families because the size of the revenue pie is increased by the heavier carbon footprints of the wealthiest households.
The goal of carbon pricing is to incentivize consumers and businesses to reduce emissions, while giving them flexibility to choose what works best for them. But why give the revenues back? One answer is because the gifts of nature—including the limited capacity of the biosphere to absorb carbon emissions—belong to the people, not the state. Another is that rebating the revenues avoids regressive impacts and in so doing helps to build public support. Despite their lighter carbon footprints, low- and middle-income households spend a larger fraction of their income than wealthy households on necessities, including fuels. Thus, when fuel prices rise, this hits low- and middle-income households hardest. Rebates offset this impact, while preserving the incentive to reduce emissions because households receive benefits—the carbon rebates—independent of their fuel consumption. Those who consume the least fossil fuel get the biggest net benefit. According to an analysis by the Canadian government, ~80% of Canadians see a net positive change in income thanks to the rebate. An updated analysis by the Canadian Parliamentary Budget Officer forecasts that this positive impact on the average household will persist.
The beauty of carbon dividends is that they are not intrinsically partisan: they help protect our natural heritage in a cost-effective way, benefit working-class families, and stimulate clean energy innovation and investment.
How did carbon dividends come to be in Canada? When Justin Trudeau became Prime Minister in 2015, the federal government decided something that may sound obvious: it should not be free to pollute. When firms pollute, they receive benefits but impose costs on the rest of society. Putting a price on carbon pollution helps to internalize this externality, sending a price signal that aligns firms’ and households’ incentives more closely with the public good. To accomplish this, the government devised a way to price carbon emissions and use the revenues collected in a simple, honest way: by giving the money back to Canadians.
Economically, the policy has worked well: most households come out ahead. The policy has not contributed meaningfully to inflation, being responsible for less than 1/20th of the consumer price increases. Environmentally, the policy has worked, too; since 2019, emissions have dropped by ~6%, and the most recent independent research finds that emissions will dip 34–36% below 2005 levels by 2030, if current policies continue. Keeping in mind that emissions would otherwise increase greatly, these reductions are bigger than they look. Furthermore, as the price ratchets up over time, so do the dividends.
So, what went wrong? The Canadian policy’s Achilles’ heel was the poor visibility of the dividends. When the policy was implemented, the Trudeau administration did little to advertise or explain the benefits, apparently assuming that Canadians would figure out for themselves that their dividends were more than compensating for fuel price increases. Meanwhile, the opposition relentlessly attacked the carbon fee, or “tax” as they called it, blaming the policy for any and all price increases even as the Ukraine war drove up world oil prices. And not only did the critics mischaracterize and overestimate the costs, they also totally ignored the benefits—the dividends.
The visibility problem was exacerbated by appallingly obscure payment delivery and labeling. When the carbon rebates first went into effect, they were buried as a line-item adjustment on Canadians’ income tax returns. The rebate was later delivered via electronic bank deposits, but even these were woefully labeled, sometimes as “CANADA FED” or as a string of numbers and letters. The costs of carbon pricing are advertised at every gas station, so to maintain public support the benefits must be equally—if not more—visible.
The Canadian experience has vital implications for the rest of the world. Climate change is accelerating, and its harms are often suffered by those who are least responsible. If we want to mitigate these harms, carbon pricing is a key tool in the policy kit, and dividends are a critical way to use that tool without harming working families.
Of course, there are costs to any climate policy, but they pale in comparison to the costs of inaction. Pay a couple hundred more dollars today (and get a dividend to offset that) . . . avoid paying a couple hundred thousand more tomorrow when your house is no longer insured against hurricanes, floods, or fires.
What happened in Canada highlights the importance of two key considerations: partisanship and visibility. Conserving our environment and our natural heritage is not partisan. Taking steps so that pollution is no longer free is not partisan. Carbon dividends are not partisan, unless weak messaging opens the door to willful misrepresentation. Visibility is also key: the existence and magnitude of carbon rebates must be communicated clearly and consistently to the public. If we can set the record straight and learn from Canada’s experience, then we have a real shot at good policy for the climate and for the people.
Image credit: 0x010C, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Olivier Bradley is a fourth-year honors student at University of Massachusetts Amherst, studying economics and environmental science and participating in the Community Scholars Program (CSP). Olivier can be reached via email at olivierbradley56@gmail.com or via LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/in/orbradley/.
Thank very much for this article, Olivier!
I have a few comments:
1. I’m glad to see that the Canadian government is now obliging financial institutions to make the carbon dividends/rebates more visible: https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2025/01/latest-canada-carbon-rebate-delivering-financial-boost-for-canadians.html. Hopefully it’s not too late.
2. I’d argue that visibility of the dividends isn’t the only problem here. There’s also a problem with the ‘default’ economic modelling that’s being employed in predicting the effects of the carbon pricing programme.
For example, from looking at the media coverage of this debate, I can see that some officials are claiming that the beneficial effects of the rebates will be undermined by the carbon price’s impact on broader ‘economic factors’, such as unemployment. The assumptions on which these predictions are based are highly problematic, for lots of reasons.
Confusing media framing doesn’t help either – e.g., this article starts out by strongly implying that the carbon price is doing more harm than good, yet it goes on to paint a much more nuanced picture further down in the text: https://globalnews.ca/news/10805851/carbon-tax-pbo-new-report/
3. Personally I find the economists’ statement on carbon pricing (linked to in your first paragraph above) to be overly dogmatic on the role of markets and the ‘invisible hand’. It ignores the fact that the super-rich, who are by far the most polluting income group in per capita terms, are also those who are least influenced by price.
It can be pretty discouraging for people struggling with cost-of-living challenges to see a small, wealthy minority blithely frying their way through huge amounts of oil and gas, with no meaningful constraint placed on their behaviour. The rebates can help financially, for sure, but they don’t fully address fundamental issues of effectiveness and fairness.
It’s also hard to determine the exact effects on emissions of the carbon price as compared to other emissions reductions measures in Canada. This can make the pricing programme more vulnerable to attacks from its opponents (or at least, from those of its opponents who believe than humanity really is disrupting the climate!).
Relatedly, some believe that a standalone carbon price is simply too unwieldy and unpredictable an instrument to be given the principal – and huge – responsibility of ensuring that emissions will be reduced at the rapid rate that’s needed.
In Feasta’s climate group, we’ve therefore been arguing (along with our colleagues from the Cap and Share Climate Alliance) that the most fair, clear and reliable way to ensure that emissions will be reduced at a fast enough rate would be to impose a hard cap on the production and import of fossil fuels. If this cap was imposed via a system which obliges fossil fuel producers to buy permits, then the revenue generated from that could be distributed in the same way as the Canadian climate dividends are currently distributed, with the same beneficial effects, but without the challenges mentioned above.
4. It’s often assumed by politicians and the media that most people in wealthy countries like Canada would strongly oppose any extension of carbon pricing and rebates into a system that goes beyond their own national borders.
The very idea of an international Cap and Share (or carbon pricing) system can trigger incredulous laughter in some quarters, because it would automatically shift a considerable amount of carbon revenue from richer countries to poorer countries. In the case of Canada, it would mean that the average Canadian would ‘lose out’, in a narrow financial sense, in such a system. This is considered to be a fatal problem, grounds for complete dismissal of the idea.
Yet survey evidence suggests that a strong majority of Canadians (over 85%) would actually prefer a global carbon pricing system, based on national population-based quotas (i.e. including caps, as described above) to a national one, even though they would personally lose out financially from such a system. The overall benefits of stabilising the climate and reducing global inequality are apparently – and, I would say, very rationally – being perceived by them as outweighing personal financial costs. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4448523 (It’s interesting to note that capping carbon seems to be considerably more popular than carbon taxation without a cap.)
These findings dovetail neatly with more broadly-focussed international surveys which indicate that most people around the world – including in Canada – are actually quite progressive in their economic views, and are also very concerned about the environment: https://earth4all.life/global-survey-2024/
I’d say that politicians who are concerned about the climate would do well to get out of their echo chambers and pay attention to this kind of research. Perhaps they actually need to be thinking bigger, rather than smaller.
Rather than trying to fight fire with fire in the climate pricing debate (i.e., use the same narrowly-defined and short-term economic measurements as their adversaries do, in order to try and counter their arguments), perhaps they should consider taking a more scientifically-grounded, holistic and visionary approach, by forming a partnership with Global South countries and taking the first steps towards a global Cap and Share system. This idea is explored in more detail here: https://www.feasta.org/2024/04/18/cap-and-share-a-just-and-constructive-fossil-fuel-phase-out/